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Chapter 4
Empathy and ethics: journalistic representation 
and its consequences
Annabel McGoldrick
Peace journalism was first proposed by Johan Galtung, as a develop-
ment from his landmark essay published with Mari Holmboe Ruge in 
1965, ‘The structure of foreign news’. It takes the form of a set of rec-
ommendations for reporters and editors – ‘the policy implications of 
the [1965] study’, (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p10) – that have, over the 
last decade or more, been taken up by journalism advocates and pro-
fessional trainers, and have also latterly been critically examined by 
scholarly researchers. Peace journalism claims to be a fairer and more 
accurate way of representing conflicts than the predominant strain of 
reporting, in most media, most of the time, which it identifies as ‘war 
journalism’. PJ is normative and value-explicit: if implemented more 
widely in professional practice, its advocates say, it would lessen the 
influence of media in favour of violence and create social capital for peace, 
which is to be preferred. 
To these claims, this chapter will examine whether it is possible 
to add another: that peace journalism produces more authentic and 
more healthy representations of human behaviour in conflict, enabling 
its audiences to respond, and make meanings, with parts of their re-
lational instincts and meaning-making capacities that are habitually 
suppressed. Emerging evidence is considered, from neuroscience and 
several other fields, that we are ‘soft-wired for empathy’ (Rifkin 2009), a 
facet of human nature that scholarship in general – and science in par-
ticular – generally underplays, by focusing wholly on the functioning 
of the left hemisphere of the brain (McGilchrist 2010). These scientific 
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propositions about our humanness provide further validation for peace 
journalism. In this chapter, I consider this evidence and what it adds to 
the peace journalism critique of mainstream news.
As a psychotherapist working in addiction recovery for the past 
ten years, I have witnessed at first hand, violent, aggressive, drunk and 
drugged people transform into caring, compassionate individuals. 
Change in such cases is predicated on challenging addictive behaviour 
by putting down drugs and alcohol, but that change is only maintained 
when they begin to see themselves and the world differently: to put on, 
in a metaphor favoured in the field, ‘a new pair of glasses’ (‘C’ 2003 
[1955]). These people learn how to alter their perception of reality 
and become conscious of their own meaning-making process. Part of 
that transition is for them to acquire – or the therapist to impart – the 
concept of reality as multiperspectival: they can have a ‘different reality’ 
from someone else, and still stay in relationship with them. 
The second, complementary step is to ‘switch on’ their instinct to 
empathise with the other. The self-help group Alcoholics Anonymous, 
whose formation was listed by Time Magazine as one of the 80 most 
important moments in human history (Poniewozick 2003), also heals 
through empathy, which is a remarkable quality to witness, especially 
where previously only violence and aggression were evident. It’s a 
vivid illustration of a proposition I shall draw on in this study, that 
human beings are naturally fitted for, and inclined to, empathy in 
our relationships with others – a quality that can therefore be quite 
readily reached and activated even in highly disturbed, apparently 
maladjusted individuals. 
Peace journalism embodies, and equips readers and audiences to 
apply, that same multiperspectival approach, prompting and enabling us 
to connect empathically with events we are not personally participating 
in, and with actors apparently at far remove. We can, if supplied with 
the right cues and clues, imagine ourselves ‘in the shoes’ of people in the 
news, even when we cannot, by definition, be there in person. To ‘focus 
on suffering all over [and] on people peacemakers, giving voice to the 
voiceless’ is, according to Galtung, one of the four main distinguishing 
features of peace journalism. Another is its ‘truth orientation’, which 
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Lynch (2008) has updated to denote forms and tactics of reporting that 
draw attention to dominant iterations of meaning, and enable us to inspect 
them from the outside, negotiating our own reading in the process. 
Research in the growing field of peace journalism has adopted and 
elaborated a normative preference for ‘nonviolent responses to con-
flict’ (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p6). In Johan Galtung’s original table 
setting out the peace journalism schema, the characteristics of peace 
journalism appear on the right-hand side; those of ‘war/violence jour-
nalism’ (Galtung 1998) on the left. Lynch and Galtung comment:
The position taken here is not that good reporting on conflict is some 
kind of compromise with a little from the left hand column and a 
little from the right. The position taken is in favour of the second 
column, peace journalism, and against war journalism (Lynch & 
Galtung 2010, p15). 
Elsewhere, Lynch defends this value-explicit stance as ‘instrumental’; 
enabling journalism to deliver on ‘internal goals [of] fairness and 
accuracy’ (Lynch 2008, p4). Fairness because, peace journalism scholars 
argue, media conventions generally predispose the news, in most places, 
most of the time, to a predominance of war journalism, thus depriving 
peace of its chance. Accuracy because, while peace initiatives broadly 
defined, are present in all conflicts, they are usually excluded from the 
representations of those conflicts furnished by the news. Adopting a 
deliberate creative strategy, to seek them out and remit them into the 
public sphere, restores an important missing element. 
As well as through scholarly research, the peace journalism field 
has developed through training and social movement activism, usually 
with a sense of swimming upstream against the current of established 
assumptions about the role of journalism, and the capacities and 
preferences of readers and audiences. Journalists’ assumptions about 
audience preferences, and traditional news factors like ‘simplification 
vs complexity’, Kempf writes, ‘are more compatible with escalation 
oriented than with de-escalation oriented coverage’ (Kempf 2007, 
p138). The feeling is often that peace journalism advocacy amounts 
to a call for something to be imposed on ‘normal’ journalism; to offer 
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an ‘artificial prescription’, in David Loyn’s words; one that is ‘uniquely 
unhelpful’ (Loyn 2007, p2). 
The contribution of this chapter is to add another layer to the claims 
of peace journalism to be preferred as a set of precepts and methods for 
representing conflict; and to be regarded as more conducive, not only to 
the social goal of peace (and as fair and accurate in respect of its subject 
matter), but also to the needs and instincts of its publics – publics that 
are human beings, not simply rational beings, but emotional too.
It is inaccurate to represent human responses and motivations, 
in situations of conflict, without allowing for this. Furthermore, the 
dominant representations of war journalism, being ‘dehumanizing of 
“them’’ ’, abrogate and suppress a key part of our meaning-making and 
relational capacity. 
The influence of war journalism therefore shrinks and distorts 
the social reality we shape and inhabit. Our reality is constructed 
through relationships, not separate from relationships. How we behave 
in relationships, as a result, is determined by the meanings we make. 
Responses in relationships can be cooperative and empathic, or com-
petitive, suspicious and ultimately violent. With events and people we 
have not experienced personally, that relationship is necessarily formed 
and developed through media. This chapter draws together evidence 
to argue that peace journalism offers a more authentic and beneficial 
representation of human relations in conflict.
A challenge to realism(s)
‘They are our representatives, and where we can’t be, they can be’. Stuart 
Hall is speaking about politicians, in a lecture for the Media Education 
Foundation. The ability to speak and act on behalf of other people is one 
of the meanings encapsulated in the word ‘representation’, he suggests. 
The other is ‘the notion that something was there already and, through 
the media, has been represented’ (Hall 1997). 
The stress on the first syllable is from Hall’s original. A critical 
consideration of journalism, especially journalism about conflict, fore-
grounds yet a third meaning to go with the two proposed (only to be 
‘subverted’) in the lecture, and it argues for the emphasis of the syllables 
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to be reversed. Reports from battle-zones have concentrated increas-
ingly on re-present-ing, dramatising a sense of excitement that we can 
be ‘virtually there’, albeit with a characteristically restricted view, down 
a gun barrel or missile sight. In Operation Desert Storm, the campaign 
to eject the forces of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, pictures 
from the nose-cones of guided missiles, carrying out ‘surgical strikes’, 
played to a video game generation. In the invasion of 2003, embedded 
camera crews brought point-of-view shots of actual firefights to a ‘first-
person shooter’ computer game generation. 
Ottosen shows how ‘the political and economic roots of computer 
games on war are entrenched in the military-industrial complex and 
the defence industry’ (Ottosen 2008, p73), arguing that these play an 
increasingly important role as a recruiting tool and a means of dissemi-
nating war propaganda. Der Derian goes so far as to postulate ‘a paradox 
… that the closer the war game [is] able to technically reproduce the 
reality of war, the greater the dangers that might arise from confusing 
one with the other’ (Der Derian 2009, p14).
Audiences in the rich countries that engage in what Der Derian 
says is presented as ‘virtuous war’, are immersed in images that offer 
to reproduce the experience of waging it; especially as it is increasingly 
carried out from within a virtual realm, with remote-controlled drones 
bombing faraway places at the click of a mouse. War is being made 
‘present’, in ‘real’ time, thanks to computer games, 24-hour news and the 
internet: a signifier lifted to a new position of prominence in the culture 
because it is attended by a feeling of accessible authenticity. 
To adapt Der Derian’s paradox still further, the virtual representation 
of war draws on, and reinforces, a realist view of conflict. Lord 
Palmerston, the 19th-century British Foreign Secretary and exponent 
of gunboat diplomacy, encapsulated this doctrine in a formula that 
is usually paraphrased as ‘nations have no permanent friends, only 
permanent interests’. The realist paradigm of international relations 
constructs interests in conflict as phenomena confined and defined by 
state borders. Wars start when states declare them, in pursuit of their 
interests, and peace is what prevails when they cease firing. 
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Inscribed in this paradigm is the extension, to the imagined 
community of a nation, of a set of propositions about human nature, 
formulated by philosophers such as Hobbes and Descartes. The 
Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body exalted ‘reason’ above ‘passion’, 
which threatened to distort ‘logical’ thought. In the empiricist school, 
‘hard evidence’, available through sensory contact with the material 
world, was valued above ‘mere sentiment’. In Leviathan, Hobbes (1982 
[1651]) developed his famous argument that the deterrent effect of 
a social contract is necessary to forestall a ‘war of all, against all’ as 
individuals pursue their narrowly defined, selfish interests. This can 
be – and, in the realist school, often is – conceived in analogous terms 
in the context of international relations. The United Nations, Galtung 
observes, has ‘a Security Council (not Peace, or Peace and Security, 
Council)’, based, as it is, on ‘a security approach [that] sees some party 
as a threat to be deterred or eliminated’ (Galtung 2007, p14).
One notable omission from this picture is any notion of empathy. 
Between them, the rationalist and materialist philosophies of 17th-
century Europe instilled a cultural bias in favour of assumptions 
that human beings are essentially self-interested, and that appeals to 
friendship, emotional responses and fellow-feeling can be relegated 
(as means of explaining and regulating our behaviour) below what 
can be seen, measured and ‘optimised’ in a competitive world. The 
latter qualities are constructed as more realistic, more authentic to 
our true nature. This bias remains pervasive, in the mainstream of 
academic disciplines such as economics and political science, as well 
as international relations: all, coincidentally or not, fields of scholarship 
influential on journalism. 
Objections to the realist paradigm often originate in the critical 
discourses that have successfully challenged it in other sections of 
academia, namely structuralism and post-structuralism. Within the 
field of journalism, these have supplied conceptual underpinnings 
for the movement, of ideas, social movement campaigns, professional 
training and, latterly, academic research interests, known as peace 
journalism. It has been articulated in calls for a critical self-awareness 
to be built into the job of reporting. ‘Of course reporters should report, 
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as truthfully as they can’, Lynch says, ‘the facts they encounter; only ask, 
as well, how they have come to meet these particular facts, and how the 
facts have come to meet them’ (Lynch 2008, p4). Peace journalism is 
explicit in its commitment to get beyond ‘the way it is’ – the evidence 
immediately at hand to the reporter in the field – to enable readers and 
audiences to negotiate readings of ‘how and why it came to be that way’ 
(Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p214) – and how it could be different. 
However, efforts to promote such insights often call to mind Barbie 
Zelizer’s observation about ‘interpretive communities’ (Zelizer 2004) 
that tend to talk past each other, inhabiting, perhaps, what CP Snow 
identified as the ‘two cultures’ of intellectual life – the sciences and 
humanities. David Loyn, the BBC reporter and leading critic of peace 
journalism, appealed to scientistic concepts of knowledge and evidence 
in his attempt to disprove its claims (Loyn 2007). Thus it is significant to 
find a challenge to realism, and validation for empathy, emerging from 
its own ‘home ground’ of the natural sciences. 
Empathy
In The empathic civilisation, Jeremy Rifkin subjects the inherited 
assumptions from rationalist and empiricist philosophies to critical 
examination, drawing on evidence from multiple sources, including 
a discovery by scientists at an Italian laboratory of connections in the 
brain they called ‘mirror neurons’. Purely by accident, researchers found 
that when a monkey ate a peanut, the same parts of the monkey’s brain 
lit up as when it watched a researcher eat a peanut. Giacomo Rizzolatti 
says what is most striking is that ‘[m]irror neurons allow us to grasp the 
minds of others not through conceptual reasoning but through direct 
simulation. By feeling not by thinking’ (in Rifkin 2009, p83). We learn 
through mimicry – ‘monkey see, monkey do’ – and we feel what others 
are feeling in the same way. These have been dubbed empathy neurons, 
or ‘Gandhi neurons’, because their existence appears to validate claims 
that we humans – as individuals and, by extension, collectively – are 
capable of setting aside our own narrow self-interest, in order to put 
ourselves in others’ shoes, utilising our emotions.
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McGilchrist produces a reading of ‘Western civilisation’ as having 
been based on misplaced assumptions about the sovereignty of 
conscious reasoning, situated in the left hemisphere of the brain, in 
shaping human responses: 
[I]n the context of intellectual discourse we are always obliged to ‘look 
at’ the relationship of cognition to affect from the cognitive point 
of view … Asking cognition, however, to give a perspective on the 
relationship between cognition and affect is like asking an astronomer 
in the pre-Galilean geocentric world whether, in his opinion, the sun 
moved round the earth or the earth round the sun. To ask the question 
alone would be enough to label one as mad. (McGilchrist 2010, p186)
Affect and emotions are experienced by the right hemisphere of the 
brain, which sees the whole and the context. Our awareness is about the 
interaction of both hemispheres – the left hemisphere sees the detail, 
is rigid, and is concerned with possession and manipulation. However, 
right hemisphere representations of reality have, McGilchrist argues, 
been subjugated by a dominant left hemisphere.
The counterpart of the evermore sophisticated ‘simulation’ of 
warfare, Der Derian writes, is ‘media dissimulation’ (Der Derian 2009, 
p264) over what Lynch, in reviewing his book, calls ‘the grim reality 
of thousands killed’ (Lynch 2009) when the weapons actually land. 
‘Dehumanization of “them’’ ’ is a standard propaganda tactic, and a staple 
of war journalism (Galtung 1998), used to inure target populations to 
campaigns of organised violence, implying that our empathic capacities 
have to be nullified, in order to enable us to go along with it. In a 
different setting – the US prison system – Ari Cowan, who devised a 
prevention and restoration model for intervention to lessen incidents of 
violence, finds that: ‘Central to human ability to commit acts of violence 
is an “objectification/action” process in which the recipient of violence 
must be converted conceptually from a human being to an object’ 
(Cowan 2011).
Reverse this conceptual conversion, Cowan has found, by 
reactivating our empathic connection with one another, and the 
incidence of violence falls steeply. Realism – in both senses, of the 
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dominant international relations paradigm and the apparent re-present-
ing brought about by innovations in war reporting – may not be as 
‘realistic’ as is commonly supposed, since both depend on suppressing 
a substantial segment of reality in the way we relate to one another as 
human beings.
Then, we have been taught to mistrust our feeling selves, Rifkin 
writes, by psychoanalysis, where Freud’s postulation of our aggressive 
‘drive’, thanatos, required catharsis to render it manageable in everyday 
life. (Perhaps those violent computer games are good for us after all!) 
However, Freud may have simply missed a vitally important part of 
being human – the empathy. He mistook the bond between mother and 
child as satisfying the child’s libido, discussing the infant feeding with 
its mother: ‘I cannot discover this oceanic feeling in myself ’ (in Rifkin 
2009, p52). (Perhaps it is purely coincidental that Descartes’ mother 
died when he was a baby, and that Hobbes was born prematurely to a 
mother terror-stricken by news of the Spanish Armada on the way to 
invade England, and abandoned by his father at a tender age.)
My work as a psychotherapist has brought me into contact with 
research on child development, which has emphasised the primary 
importance of the attachment between child and mother, the formation 
of which then shapes the way we form relationships for the rest of our 
lives. When that attachment is not formed, the child can feel a deep 
sense of abandonment and act that out in later life. Results can include 
pathologies leading to obsession, addiction and antisocial behaviour. 
One study in the 1960s assessed babies into adulthood, and found that 
the more securely attached infants grew up to be more sociable adults, 
a general rule observed in countless individual cases by care workers 
such as Camila Batmanghelidjh, who set up Kids Company in London, 
in 1995. 
[If] you actually look at what neuroscience is telling us about the way 
children’s brains develop’, she said in a recent interview, ‘it is absolutely 
evident that the frontal lobe, which is the area responsible for pro-
social behaviour and assessing consequences of your action doesn’t 
develop robustly in males until they’re 27 and in females until they’re 
25. (Batmanghelidjh 2010)
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She continues: 
Neuroscience is saying the quality of attachment relationship that is 
provided for you sculpts your ability to control your behaviour, plan 
and be pro-social. It’s saying if children are frightened and terrorised 
and impoverished nutritionally then there is an impact on the way 
their brain develops. It doesn’t mean that we can’t correct their 
behaviour, but we can’t hold them criminally responsible at age ten. 
No child is born a criminal or a killer, any child who commits a crime, 
there is a legacy of crimes committed against that child, prior to the 
time they got to be the perpetrator. (Batmanghelidjh 2010)
Rifkin argues that many fields of research are simultaneously 
supplying evidence that humans are ‘soft-wired for empathy’. For 
whatever reason, Freud’s propositions about what ‘really’ determines 
our responses – that human nature is aggressive and sexually driven 
– are based on observations of pathologies, or at least a ‘secondary 
movement’ after our primary movement towards nurture, relationship, 
empathy and connection was not fulfilled in infancy. 
The successful treatment of patients with addictions, referred 
to above, has been based on treating the addiction as an attachment 
disorder; in other words, the secondary movement of the person with 
an addiction is towards a self-destructive behaviour. They are only 
able to make that primary movement towards relationship, empathy 
and connection in adulthood, by first attaching to a self-help group or 
therapist – effectively being ‘re-parented’ – before going on, in many 
cases, to lead normal healthy lives, based on a reactivated capacity for 
empathy and care for others. ‘AA bridged the gap’, Rifkin says: 
between the object relationship theorists and behaviouralists, by 
acknowledging the critical relational and emotional aspects of social 
well-being and the important role that empathic engagement plays in 
recovery, while at the same time creating a twelve-step program that 
contained elements of behavioural conditioning. (Rifkin 2009, p400)
‘Some of the claims of peace journalism’, Lynch and McGoldrick 
write (2010, p95), ‘are realist … in the sense of fidelity’ to a pre-existing 
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reality. Through its mission to ‘highlight peace initiatives’ (Galtung 
1998), peace journalism ‘connect[s] with visions and creative ideas for 
peace’ (Lynch & McGoldrick 2010, p95) that are invariably present, 
in any conflict, but usually suppressed in media representations – the 
mainstream of ‘war journalism’ – which can therefore be seen as less 
accurate. 
Among the other distinguishing features of peace journalism, in 
Galtung’s original table, is its emphasis on the ‘humanization of all 
sides’ through ‘empathy and understanding’ (Galtung 1998). This, too, 
is therefore more realistic, both in the sense of depicting human relations 
and in the sense of prompting and enabling a response to the events and 
processes being depicted that is more authentic and more conducive 
to the needs and instincts of readers and audiences. Rifkin’s narrative, 
re-examining dominant conceptual frames transmitted from various dis-
ciplines and discursive practices in light of multiple-sourced findings in 
support of an empathic human nature, may therefore be seen as lending 
a further authenticity-claim to peace journalism as a representation of 
conflicts and responses to them.
Lynch and McGoldrick draw attention to ‘heroes of nonviolence’: 
some wellknown, but others generally under-appreciated in their 
influence on our lives, because of ‘cultural phenomena’ such as the 
preponderance of depictions of violent heroes on American-made 
children’s television programs (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p78). More 
coverage, not only of the Nelson Mandelas and Mother Teresas of this 
world, but also less heralded nonviolent change agents – such as those 
featured in chapter 12 of the present volume by Elissa Tivona – would 
contribute towards rebalancing a presently distorted picture. 
For adult audiences, of course, our allegiances are manipulated 
in more sophisticated and often more ambivalent ways. In Silence of 
the lambs, serial killer Hannibal Lecter is consulted by FBI agent 
Clarice Starling because only he ‘really’ knows what is ‘really’ going 
on: his depravity having stripped away the ‘illusions’ the rest of us find 
necessary to carry on living. Anthony Hopkins’ mesmeric portrayal 
seeps into us deviously; his is hardly a view of human nature that we 
would accept as ‘the whole story’, and yet – by squeezing out empathy 
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– the conventions of war reporting effectively conceptualise the human 
beings on the ‘other’ side – the ‘Taliban’, to take a current example – in 
the manner of a serial killer sizing up potential victims. 
British psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen has suggested that we 
may substitute the words ‘zero empathy’ for ‘evil’ (Baron-Cohen 2011) 
and that people who perpetrate acts of violence without conscience – 
whether they be US soldiers, the Taliban, or Nazis exterminating Jews 
in the Holocaust – be regarded as having ‘zero degrees of empathy’. The 
point is, we should be assessing anything that causes empathy-erosion – 
like war journalism – and seeking to reduce it.
Peace journalism, by humanising ‘them’, fires the mirror neurons and 
creates the scope for more mimicry and repetition. Among the research 
data adduced by Rifkin are findings that television viewers’ facial 
expressions even match those of people they are viewing. These, in turn, 
echo findings from experiments on the psychological phenomenon of 
merging: asking people to put themselves in someone else’s shoes, then 
write a ‘day in the life’ of, respectively, a senior, a cheerleader and a 
university professor (Galinsky et al. 2005). Participants unconsciously 
mirrored the behaviour and perceptions of their model: the first was 
observed to walk noticeably more slowly, the second saw herself as more 
physically attractive, and the third performed better in intelligence tests. 
The relation between what we watch and the way we think, feel 
and behave may not be linear, or direct. But the explosion of evidence, 
appearing simultaneously in many fields, for believing that we are, in 
Rifkin’s terms, soft-wired for empathy, may further explain the findings 
of my own earlier study (McGoldrick 2008) based on interviews with 
subjects about their experience of watching news in general, and about 
the distinctions in the peace journalism model in particular. In it, I 
quote Rollo May’s study of our modern quest for meaning (May 1991, 
p134). May characterises Heidegger’s theories as having ‘made care 
(sorge) the basis of being: without care, our selves shrink up, we lose our 
capacity to will as well as our selfhood’. 
In McGilchrist’s account, the capacity for caring is situated in the 
right hemisphere of the brain, which gives the context, sees the whole, 
the big picture, while the left supplies language and sequence, being 
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concerned with manipulation, possession, rivalry and power. Too much 
news ‘gives us a long list of problems with no opportunities for us to 
apply our care’, I argued, thus addressing only the left hemisphere. As a 
result, subjects in my study reported strong, overwhelmingly negative 
responses: the experience of watching news triggered ‘lingering feelings 
of depression, helplessness, hopelessness and alienation’ (McGoldrick 
2008, p94). News about conflict, particularly war reporting, which 
is presented as such a realistic portrayal of such an authentic human 
experience, may actually be harmful to consumers precisely because 
it subjugates and misleadingly ‘frames out’ a substantial portion of 
human nature.
Indeed, journalism, as a report of ‘just the facts’ – which could 
therefore be construed as a Hobbesian practice – comes with the same, 
familiar in-built bias against empathy. The unrealistic human relations 
it constructs – and to which it contributes – can be glimpsed in the 
infamous picture of a starving Sudanese girl, watched over by a waiting 
vulture, that appeared in The New York Times (Carter 1993). The 
photographer Kevin Carter won a Pulitzer Prize, but unlike his fellow 
journalists, readers were less interested in the technical quality of the 
picture and more interested in what happened to the child. 
In an editors’ note four days after the photo first appeared, The Times 
said: ‘The photographer reports that she recovered enough to resume 
her trek after the vulture was chased away. It is not known whether she 
reached the [relief] center’ (in Moeller 1999, p148). Two months after 
receiving his Pulitzer, Carter would be dead of carbon-monoxide poi-
soning in Johannesburg, a suicide at 33. Did he lack the empathy to 
put down his camera and help her? His role as a journalist mandated 
a ‘detachment’ from his own feelings. Did the guilt of that contribute 
to his death? He told a friend: ‘I’m really, really sorry I didn’t pick up 
the child’ (in Moeller 1999, p40). The science of trauma tells us that 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is much more likely if people are 
unable to make sense, and a meaningful outcome, from a horrific inci-
dent. If you witness an atrocity and feel empathy for someone, then if 
you can somehow involve yourself in helping them – saving their lives, 
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as in the case of the Sudanese girl, or joining in, however vicariously, ef-
forts to prevent a repetition of such incidents – you are much less likely 
to develop PTSD, because the event thereby acquires more meaning.
group responses
If particular patterns of news reporting – encapsulated in Galtung’s 
description of war journalism – can be regarded, on this basis, as poten-
tially harmful on an individual basis, separate research has highlighted 
the importance of our empathic capacity, conveyed through mirror 
neurons, in governing group responses. If someone watches a report 
of an atrocity against another group – a white European, say, watches 
coverage of the bombing of Gaza, with a Palestinian – they are likely to 
feel the same feelings as the Palestinians (Argo et al. 2009, p30).
And this works the other way too: in experiments at MIT and 
Harvard – funded by Queen Noor of Jordan and Richard Branson – 
subjects have been shown to respond to an attack on a member of a 
group with which they identify by wanting ‘revenge’, more than if the 
attack is made upon them personally. Many researchers have made 
the link between group status, sense of self and personal self-esteem. 
Examples include the 1992 Los Angeles race riots where TV news 
showed repeated images of Rodney King being beaten by police officers 
– officers who were later acquitted in court. More recently, studies on 
the radicalisation of militants in Iraq have linked it to the humiliating 
images of prisoners in Abu Ghraib being mistreated by US soldiers. 
Similar findings were repeated in laboratory conditions when 240 
people in Boston watched violent vignettes:
First, subjects were more likely to report a desire to retaliate at the 
perpetrator when their friend was the injured party than when they 
themselves were slighted or harmed. This finding was strongest for 
men, and strongest for subjects under age 30. Second, females were 
more likely to report that the perpetrator deserved to have retribution 
meted upon him when a group member was the injured party than 
when they themselves were. (Argo et al. 2009, p28)
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Is it possible that these responses might now be more widespread 
and more rapid because of intensified media coverage? Here’s the view 
of a young Palestinian in the occupied territories:
The difference between the first intifada and the second is television. 
Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, 
but the reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I 
cannot get away from Israel – the TV brings them into my living room 
… And you can’t turn the TV off. How could you live with yourself? 
At the same time, you can’t ignore the problem – what are you doing 
to protect your people? We live with an internal struggle. Whether you 
choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle. (in Argo et 
al. 2009, p9)
Significant in this context is evidence that group information is 
processed in emotional centres of the brain. ‘That is, group-related 
reasoning and perception may well be implicit, emotional, and untouch-
able via traditional cognitive and rational approaches’ (Argo et al. 2009, 
p33). This holds profound implications for considerations of media in-
fluence on the actions and motivations of parties to conflict, whether 
direct or indirect, linear or extra-linear. It suggests we are more likely 
to find differential group responses to media representations of conflict 
through adjusting the more emotional, less explicit content, than the 
more cognitive, fact-based elements: revealing elements of context and 
background through telling a story based on human interest, perhaps. 
A study of reader responses to crime stories in a US university 
showed greater receptiveness to ‘peaceful’ policy prescriptions – in the 
sense of attending to structural causes – among students whose em-
pathic responses had been evoked by the news being framed in ways 
very similar to the peace journalism method for reporting conflicts. 
The Berkeley Media Studies Group, a lobby group for public health and 
social issues, carried out training with journalists in the newsrooms of 
five metropolitan newspapers. As with the experience of peace jour-
nalism training, participants were sometimes ‘defensive and bristly’, but 
many still said it had an effect on how they would cover crime in the 
future (Thorson et al. 2001, p414). 
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Precepts for the training were derived from the public health model 
of violence, adopted officially in the US by Surgeon General C Everett 
Koop in the 1980s, since the time when violence prevention became 
the domain of public health departments (Thorson et al. 2003, p53). 
In this model, death from violent crime is seen as preventable if the 
underlying causes are investigated, such as availability of alcohol, guns, 
unemployment, racial discrimination, violence in the media, lack of 
education, abuse as a child, witnessing violence, and male dominance 
over females. Researchers found that readers of crime stories framed 
with this public health model are more likely to be less blaming of 
the perpetrators and look to societal causes and want holistic social/
political initiatives to address those causes (Thorson et al. 2003, p53).
‘A good reporter does not stop a story of two cars shocking, known 
as a collision’, Lynch and Galtung write, ‘with an account of those killed 
or wounded, and material damage’ (2010, p3). In an analogy intended 
to validate the peace journalism approach to reporting conflict, they go 
on to recommend consideration of the human cost of the rush-hour 
effect, with everyone attempting to drive to work at the same time and 
even – if alcohol is involved – the underlying reasons why people, in 
the society under discussion, use alcohol inappropriately or excessively. 
This, they say, is essential if journalism is ‘to make the world transparent, 
unveiling causal chains’ (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p4). 
This is, in fact, an example of how expanding and spreading 
understanding of what Lynch and Galtung call the ‘condition–
consequence’ relationship – the process leading up to an event – actually 
helped to bring about a change in outcomes. Until the 1960s, traffic 
accidents in the US were simply blamed on ‘the nut behind the wheel’ 
(Coleman & Thorson 2002, p403). Then ‘the media began to include the 
type of cars involved, road and weather conditions, and whether people 
were driving drunk or wearing seatbelts’. It helped to create demand 
for safety features to be added to cars, for the wearing of seatbelts, and 
raised the social pressure against drink-driving – and the number of 
accidents fell.
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Ethics and consequences
Shinar (2007, p200) put forward a set of five headings for exercises in 
content analysis to identify and recognise peace journalism
1. Exploring backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, and 
presenting causes and options on every side so as to portray conflict 
in realistic terms transparent to the audience
2. Giving voice to the views of all rival parties
3. Offering creative ideas for conflict resolution, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping
4. Exposing lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, and 
revealing excesses committed by, and suffering inflicted on, peoples 
of all parties
5. Paying attention to peace stories and postwar developments.
These all require and activate empathy in regarding and analysing 
conflicts, just like the reporting of road accidents, in allowing for a 
cataclysm, or an act of direct violence, to emerge from a background 
and provide a context resulting in an effort to understand how the 
perpetrators could have been brought to commit it. If the perpetrator 
is simply a ‘nut’, behaving with no discernible reason, then it apparently 
makes no sense to reason with them: for there to be scope for creative 
ideas of conflict resolution, there has to be an intelligible cause–
consequence chain, and, for that to emerge, all parties – ‘them’ as well 
as ‘us’ – have to have a voice. 
War journalism, on the other hand, in the original schema by Johan 
Galtung (in Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p6), is journalism orientated:
•	 towards violence
•	 towards propaganda
•	 towards elites
•	 towards victory.
Why should the former be adopted, over the latter? When I was 
chairing the Reporting the World meetings in London in 2001 – a series 
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of reflective discussions for professional journalists about their coverage 
of particular conflicts – a senior editor at the BBC World Service said: 
I do think there’s a danger of seeing a coincidence of interest between 
people engaged in conflict resolution, and the media. Conflict 
resolution is something on which I report, not something in which 
I engage. A side-effect of my reporting may be that it makes conflict 
resolution harder or easier, but that’s a judgment that is made after our 
reporting. (Bob Jobbins in Lynch 2002, p24)
This is the journalistic ethics of duty, or conviction – to report 
‘without fear or favour’, in the classic phrase. It is the reporter’s duty 
not to empathise, not to consider how he or she may be involved in the 
story or consider how the reporting may be adjusted, in advance, in 
light of any such involvement. This deontological ethic of journalism 
can, Lynch and McGoldrick suggest, be conceptualised with reference 
to the universalising principle of Immanuel Kant: ‘I ought never to act, 
except in such a way that I would will that my maxim [in so acting] 
could become a universal law’. 
However, journalism is ‘always already’ involved, Lynch and 
McGoldrick say – explicitly adopting a characteristic formula of the 
critical discourse of post-structuralism – in a ‘feedback loop of cause 
and effect’. They quote Max Weber’s concept of an ‘ethic of responsibility’, 
a teleological ethic, as the appropriate governing principle. 
One should take into account the foreseeable consequences of one’s 
actions, [Weber] argued, and adjust one’s behaviour accordingly – it is 
foreseeability that confers responsibility. A deontological journalistic 
ethic is, in this sense, merely a teleological one ‘in waiting’ – waiting 
for a convincing explanation of the relations of cause and effect. 
(Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p218)
That explanation becomes more convincing when considering the 
rapidly growing body of evidence that war journalism, the dominant 
mode of news reporting, influenced, through different means of 
transmission, by Hobbesian empiricism and Cartesian rationality – 
both of which relegate empathic, emotional responses – has identifiable 
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consequences, for both individual psychological wellbeing and group 
receptiveness to particular policy prescriptions. 
If peace journalism can offer us more empathic responses to 
conflict, more examples of those working cooperatively for bridge-
building or human rights, we have more behaviours to mirror. Whereas 
the exponents of war journalism can no longer hide behind claims 
that we cannot foresee the consequences of reporting in that way, this 
same evidence supports the claim that both war and peace journalism 
deserve their name: in general, the one makes more violence more likely, 
whereas the other makes it less likely. Journalism cannot be regarded as 
‘detached’ – it is implicated in cycles of cause and effect.
It is in this context, among other senses, that Hall’s less ‘literal’ 
concept of representation, set out in his lecture, acquires particular 
resonance. Representation is not separate from the event, he says, but 
‘constitutive’ of it: ‘one of its conditions of existence’. And it’s interesting 
for our discussion that Mikhail Bakhtin, whose work is often seen as a 
forerunner of structuralism and post-structuralism, articulated his own 
philosophy of human nature in explicitly empathetic terms: 
To be means to communicate … To be means to be for another, and 
through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign 
territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside 
himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another. (in 
Rifkin 2009, p147) 
The rhetorical connection with state sovereignty, which is the basis 
for the realist paradigm in international relations, is a clue as to the 
resonance of Bakhtin’s insight for the entire philosophical tradition 
that Rifkin, McGilchrist and others are now reworking in light of these 
recent findings. 
Clifford Christians argues from a standpoint of ‘philosophical an-
thropology’ (2010, p16) that peace journalism calls on the journalist’s 
‘liberal self ’, based on ‘social contract theory’, transmitted from Hobbes 
through the work of such thinkers as Locke, Rousseau and Rawls. But 
the nature of journalism, and its inescapable involvement with causes 
and consequences, demands revision of the concept of self at the heart 
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of this theory: the ‘Robinson Crusoe’ figure alone on an island (Chris-
tians 2010, p17). Instead, Christians posits a ‘relational self ’, which fits 
much better with the new paradigm of empathy. He writes:
In addition to this demanding agenda – one could argue, our first 
order of business – peace journalism must transform its philosophy 
of the human. Rather than presuming the liberal/contractual self, 
the foundation of the new thinking is holistic humanness where 
community is ontologically and axiologically prior to persons. 
When we start intellectually with humans-in-relation, the golden 
rule becomes a credible normative standard for both the general 
morality and professional journalism ethics in this contentious age. 
(Christians 2010, p28)
Conclusion
Peace journalism sets up a binary opposition, directing our attention 
to what is wrong with journalism as it has been practised, and enabling 
calls for its improvement. It creates a need and an incentive to find 
reasons why it should be preferred. The emergence of new evidence of 
our capacity for empathy, as part of holistic humanness, strengthens its 
claims. And the marshalling of that evidence into coherent challenges 
to the philosophical underpinnings of our inherited ‘war system’ – as 
per the work of Rifkin and McGilchrist – strengthens them still further, 
by tracing connections with the struggles underway around binary 
oppositions in other academic disciplines and in social movements. 
For the journalist, rather than being asked to follow a prescribed set 
of ethical rules, mandating an unattainable aspiration to ‘detachment’, 
professionals can connect with, and trust, their most basic empathic 
human instinct to behave relationally, morally and ethically to inform 
and enlighten their audiences. In other words, peace journalism 
produces a more authentic and realistic representation of human 
relations in conflict, thereby offering humanity the best chance of 
being able to resolve differences nonviolently, and ultimately transform 
relationships into a more nurturing reality.
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